Abstract-Fashion tech products have both fashion elements and functional elements. These dual attributes lead to two opposite consumption externalities: on one hand, the fewer users, the more utilities she can get; on the other hand, a consumer will be more likely to buy when there are more buyers. Taking these two opposite effects into account, we study the optimal intertemporal pricing strategies assuming that customers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic values of the product. Our results suggest how firms should adjust their optimal pricing strategies under different market circumstances.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digitization and personalization of consumers' purchasing behavior have had great influence on high-tech industries. Consumers decide to buy products not only from their functional needs but also for showing their uniqueness and fashion flavor. So some high tech products have more and more appearance designs and fashion elements. These products can be defined as fashion tech products [1] . The typical examples include smartphones, wearable digital devices or intelligent furniture. Many customers purchase them to show their unique taste and social status [2, 3] . The buyer's utility decreases with the number of buyers. For example, people who buy an iPhone right after it is launched would often show off on social media or online space. However, as time passes and users accumulate, before a new version is launched, fashion tech firms focus more and more on improving the functionality of this version and user experience through technology innovation. In this period, the growing number of users may increase customer perception of product quality and thus positive consumption externality coexists with negative consumption externality. Positive consumption externality means the more buyers involved, the higher utility the consumers can get if they buy this product. For example, people make purchasing decisions by following their friends' choice.
Because the dominant externality in customers' decisions evolves over time and customers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic valuation of the product, fashion tech firms can charge different prices at different selling stages to fully extract consumer surplus and make a profit. Motivated by the above examples, this paper mainly studies the optimal pricing strategy of fashion tech firms when there exist two consumption externalities and heterogeneous customers. Specifically, we focus on answering the following research questions: 1) Which consumers are attracted to purchase in the two sales stages respectively and what is their valuation of the product?
2) What are the optimal pricing strategies for firms to maximize the profit when considering both consumer externalities and heterogeneity?
3) How do factors related to market circumstances influence the optimal pricing strategies?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section II we review the related literature. Section III presents a brief description of our model. In Section IV we show the optimal pricing strategies for fashion tech firms by solving the model. Section V gives some managerial insights and concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This paper focuses on the purchasing behavior of consumers based on two consumption externalities and the pricing strategies of fashion tech firms. We review the relevant literature as follows.
Leibenstein [3] first explains conspicuous purchasing behavior by the snob effect which means consumer utilities would decrease with the number of other buyers. Based on Leibenstein's research, many scholars study conspicuous goods and snob effect from various perspectives. Ameldoss and Jain [2] find that snob effect does exist in consumptions of cars, cosmetics and watches. They study the pricing strategies for a firm with a certain curve of supply and demand and conclude that snobs may enlarge their demands only when followers emerge. Arifoglu et al. [5] study a two-stage model where a firm sells a product to snobbish consumers. In their model, consumers' valuation of the product consists of two parts. One part is the basic value of the product which is not related to the *Corresponding author: Xiaofang Wang (wangxiaofang@rbs.ruc.edu.cn) number of buyers. Another part called social value is exactly brought by snob effect which is negative linearly decreasing in the number of actual buyers. Similar with [5] , we also model the snob effect in consumers' utility functions at both stages. Different from [5] , we assume that consumers' basic valuation of the product is uniformly distributed, instead of "high" or "low". Besides, we consider positive externality (functional effect) on the second stage.
Regarding positive externality, Deutsch and Gerard [6] show that social conformity and influences can generate positive externality. The social conformity and influences theory indicate that the more people having some behavior, the higher probability that followers would adopt this behavior as well. Katz and Shapiro [7] argue that customer utility may increase with the number of other buyers due to improved quality of the product, resulting from complementary products or after sale service. Candogan and Bimpikis [8] study the pricing strategies of a firm whose consumers' utility is increasing with the number of other buyers. The authors compare the optimal pricing strategies when considering positive externality or not and find the former is better. Like [8] we take positive externality into account when studying a monopolistic firm's pricing strategies, but differently, we combine it with snob effect and adopt an intertemporal perspective.
Intertemporal pricing strategy of firms has been studied by many researchers. Besanko and Winston study a dynamic pricing model base on Nash Equilibrium [9] . They argue that compared to myopic customers, strategic customers have a higher price elasticity because the latter will consider the consumption in the future as substitution. Su studies the pricing strategy of a firm whose product is perishable and under limited inventory within finite and continuous sale period [10] . The research reveals that the waiting behavior of customers with low valuation of the product is a threaten or competition to those with high valuation. Yu and Debo et al. study intertemporal pricing of new experience good base on reviews of product quality from early users [11] . They find that informative quality review from users may not always be beneficial to the firm. Different from [9] and [10] , we model the two consumer externalities. The effect of early users' reviews studied in [11] can be seen as a type of consumer externality but it may be positive or negative.
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
There is a firm selling a fashion tech product within two stages. At stage one, this firm is leading the industry and there are no competitors in the market. Assuming total demand in the market is standardized as 1, and sales volume at the two stages are and respectively, so + ∈ [0,1]. Each customer can purchase at most one product.
Consumers' heterogeneity is reflected in their intrinsic valuation of the product and this valuation is independent of externalities. We assume is uniformly distributed in [0,1], which means customers may estimate the product's value differently according to their own experiences, preference and information in hand [12] . Consumers with higher valuation are typically less price-sensitive and intend to purchase the product in the first stage [4] . So the utility of a consumer who purchases the product on stage one is as follows,
We use to denote the coefficient of snob effect, so (1 − ) denotes the social utility the consumer can obtain through parading which is decreasing with the number of other buyers in this stage. And is the basis price at stage two. We assume is not controlled by the firm due to some market factors such as technology evolution, competitions and scale of production. In stage one the firm charge a different price + .
In the second stage we use ∈ [0,1] to denote the discount coefficient in customers' valuation due to wait. A bigger represents more patient consumers and a shorter stage one. And we can write the consumer utility in stage two as,
In stage two, in addition to the snob effect, due to the improved functions of the product, consumers will experience the functional effect which presents the positive externality. We measure the functional effect by ( + ), which indicates that consumers' utility is increasing with the actual number of users. Besides, we assume the positive externality dominates in this period, so < .
Note that the intrinsic valuation is uniformly distributed in [0,1] and the whole demand is normalized to 1. Since customer valuation has a discount factor over time , customers whose valuation is higher than will purchase the product in stage one. Thus the first-stage demand = 1 − . Similarly, the secondstage demand is composed by customers with valuations between .
We use c < 1 to denote unit production cost of the firm which is fixed on both stages. We then write the profit of the firm on different stages as: = + Δ − , = ( − ).Thus the total profit is:
IV. MODEL ANALYSIS At the early time when the product is launched to the market, consumers would estimate and compare the utilities in two stages and decide when to purchase the product. Thus , can be defined as follows.
Using notations,
, we obtain that = { ≥ ( , )}, = { ≤ ≤ }. Then we derive the properties in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1.
> ⇒ = 0.
We use Lemma 1 to conduct the analysis of expression of sales volume with our decision variable in the following subsection.
1) Sales volume
To derive optimal , we first give the expression of sales volume under different parameters settings and then optimize the profit numerically. 
Proposition 1 (high case).
When the basis price ≥ + : if
The basic situation ≥ + shows a market circumstance where the firm owns advanced technology and the speed of technology evolution is quite low. When and are both high, all consumers' utilities on stage two are negative and thus no sales occur on this stage. When is moderate, that is < < + 1 − , some customers may still purchase on stage one. When continues to increase to that ≥ + 1 − , all consumers' utilities are negative and thus there are no sales volume at both stages.
Proposition 2 (low case).

When basis price
In this case basis price is extremely low which represents that technology evolution is fast or the firm is not competitive in the market. So under this circumstance, consumer utility is always positive on stage two that means all consumers would choose to purchase the product eventually. When is moderate, that is − ≤ ≤ 1 + − − , consumers dispersedly purchase on the two stages. When is high, that is > 1 + − − , all consumers choose to purchase just on stage two.
Proposition 3 (medium case).
If the basis price satisfies that < < + : when < ≤ ( ) (
When
Proposition 3 reveals a complicated case where consumers may purchase in stage one only, stage two only, or at both stages. Under certain degree of technology evolution and industrial competition, consumers' preference between these two stages varies with .
2) Optimal pricing strategies
After solving the sales volume we then derive the optimal by maximizing (3) in section III. We denote the maximized profit as * , the equilibrium sales volume at two stages are * , * respectively.
Proposition 4 (high case).
When is remarkably high , there are no sales in stage two. So the intertemporal pricing problem is reduced to a one-period pricing problem where the firm optimizes its first-stage price independent on p. In this case, market clearance exists both in situation a) or b) due to the very low basis price and causes zero snob effect on stage two. In situation a) the first stage may be more attractive because of a large snob effect coefficient. So despite the low price on stage two, some consumers with high valuation would choose to buy on stage one. In situation b), 1 + < + indicates that functional effect is remarkable and customers are more likely to wait strategically, so all the customers turn to stage two. Thus does not impact the optimal profit and can be set as any value.
Proposition 5 (low case).
Next we give the solution in the medium case in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 (medium case).
When < < + , Table II shows the optimal pricing under different conditions. 
, * = ( − ).
In summary, when the basis price is moderate, fashion tech firm should set the price difference agilely depending on parameter conditions in order to maximize the profit.
Next we classify the firm's optimal strategies as strategy A, strategy B and strategy C. Strategy A denotes the optimal pricing strategy under which customers only purchase in stage one; Strategy B denotes the optimal pricing strategy that separates the buyers into two different stages; Strategy C denotes the optimal pricing strategy under which customers only purchase in stage two. According to the previous analysis, we summarize the firm's optimal strategies under certain market circumstances in Figure 1 . In general, reflects the degree of technology evolution and competition in the industry while reflects the patience of consumers and marketing cycle of the firm. Usually, a moderate district of ( , ) indicates a diversified market in which the firm is able to meet demand through intertemporal pricing. The orange curve = ℎ( ) we defined in the graph represents the relationship between and derived from the condition * ( , ) = * ( , ) according to Proposition 6.
Note that on the right side of Figure 1 , when is remarkably high, strategy B is not optimal at any value of . The reason is that in this area, under a high or a high all customers will have a consistent preference in which stage to buy and thus the firm can't separate customers.
3) Factors influencing the optimal
In this subsection, we conduct the sensitivity analysis. When basis price is high, consumers will only purchase the product on stage one, so * is not related to or . Higher snob effect (larger ) would increase the utility of consumers so they are willing to pay more. This case is actually a single period pricing problem, the firm controls not but （ + ） because consumers only exist in stage one. So for a certain * = + , ∆ * = −1.
Corollary 2. If ≤ (low case), when 1 + > + , ∆ * > 0, ∆ * < 0, ∆ * < 0, ∆ * = 0; when 1 + < + , * can be any value thus the parameters don't affect it.
Intuitively, ∆ * > 0, ∆ * < 0, ∆ * < 0 as long as there are buyers in both stages, or any one stage. And in this low basis price case, change of would not affect the sales volume. So according to our assumption about customers' utility, the equilibrium holds still. Thus ∆ * = 0.
When basis price is moderate, conclusions about the relationships between * and , * and , * and are qualitatively the same. We next use numerical examples to illustrate the sensitivity results regarding . Set = 0.2, = 0.4, = 0.6, = 0.2, so under medium case, we get 0.4 < < 0.8. The relationship diagrams of and * , * , * and * are illustrated in Figure 2 as follows. As shown in Figure 2 , we find that as p increases, some buyers shift from stage one to stage two.
* is increasing with when is still at a low level, buyers exist in both stages and the firm should increase * to maximize profits from some consumers with high valuation on stage one. When is at a high level passing a certain threshold, customers purchase the product only in stage one and * is perfectly negative correlated with just as in high case.
V. CONCLUSION AND REMAINING QUESTIONS
Our paper mainly focuses on the pricing strategies of fashion tech firms when facing two opposite consumption externalities and heterogeneous consumers. Our results provide insights for the firms to set the right price difference between prices at two stages considering the purchase behaviors of consumers with various valuation of products. Besides, this study shows how the optimal pricing strategies change as market circumstance changes. There are several remaining questions. First, we didn't consider the situation when there is stock out especially on stage one. So we can extend our study to the pricing strategies in that case. Second, results may be different when there exist more than two stages. Finally, some empirical studies or case studies can be conducted to support our research.
APPENDIX
Sketchy proofs of main propositions are given as follows.
Lemma 1.
If > , then = { > 0} which means as long as utility in stage one is positive, customers will decide to purchase. Thus in this case is always greater than , so sales would only exist in stage one. There are no consumers willing to buy in stage two thus = 0.
Proposition 1-3.
According to (4), (5) and , , defined by us, we generate the relationship between sales volume and our decision variable through Lemma 1.
Specifically, after discussing the relationship of size between , , under the restriction 2 + ≥ 0 , three external conditions which don't include are derived as Table I shows. And to begin with the analysis, we rewrite , , here as, = + − (1 − ).
= ( )
.
= ( )( ) .
For example, if > , then λ = { ≥ }. According to Lemma 1 we know λ = 0 . And we also know that is uniformly distributed on [0,1], so we are able to derive:
So the sales volume can be written as,
It should be noticed that > is the prerequisite and if (9) holds, is within (0,1). So we have,
0 < + − (1 − ) < 1.
Next we plug (10) into (11) and (12) in reverse to generate some external conditions(contain only , and ) under which (10) may hold.
That's how we obtain the first part of Proposition 1: When basis price ≥ + : if < < + 1 − , = , = 0. The other parts from Proposition 1-3 are generated similarly.
Proposition 4-6.
Since we obtain the expression of sales volume with , then we are able to obtain optimal by plugging the sales volume into (3) and maxmizing (3).
For example, if ≥ + , we plug (10) into (3) then we have, ( ) = ( + − ).
2 + ≥ 0 represents that price in Stage one cannot be negative.
The maximum value of this quadratic function is obtained at stationary point thus we let, = (1 + + ) − − = 0.
Thus we get * as: * = (1 + + ) − . 
That's how we obtain Proposition 4 and the process is analogical to generate Proposition 5 and 6.
